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Comparaisons de Distributions Hétérogènes et Critères de Dominance 
(1) 
Résumé 
Cet  article  porte  sur  la  comparaison  des  niveaux  de  vie  lorsque  l’on  dispose  à  la  fois 
d’observations  sur  les  revenus  et  sur  la  composition  des  ménages.  Nous  généralisons 
l’approche d’Atkinson et Bourguignon (1987) dans le cas où les distributions marginales des 
besoins peuvent varier entre les populations des ménages considérées. Nous supposons que 
le  planificateur  bienveillant  a  recours  à  une  fonction  de  bien-être  social  utilitariste  pour 
classer les distributions de revenus hétérogènes. Dans la mesure où tout individu peut jouer 
le  rôle  du  planificateur,  nous  adoptons  le  point  de  vue  unanimiste  suivant  lequel  les 
jugements du planificateur doivent se conformer à un certain nombre de principes normatifs 
élémentaires.  Nous  imposons  des  conditions  de  plus  en  plus  restrictives  sur  la  fonction 
d’utilité du ménage et examinons leurs conséquences sur le classement des distributions qui 
en résulte. Ceci nous conduit à proposer quatre critères de dominance permettant de classer 
sans ambiguïté les distributions de revenu pour des populations hétérogènes. 
Mots-clés  :  Analyse  normative,  Utilitarisme,  Welfarisme,  Inégalité  et  Bien-Être 
Multidimensionnels, Dominance Stochastique Bidimensionelle, Transformations Égalisantes. 
 
Comparisons of Heterogeneous Distributions and Dominance Criteria 
(1) 
Abstract 
We  are  interested  in  the  comparisons  of  standard-of-living  across  societies  when 
observations  of  both  income  and  household  structure  are  available.  We  generalise  the 
approach of Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) to the case where the marginal distributions 
of needs can vary across the household populations under comparison. We assume that a 
sympathetic  observer  uses  a  utilitarian  social  welfare  function  in  order  to  rank 
heterogeneous  income  distributions.  Insofar  as  any  individual  can  play  the  role  of  the 
observer, we take the unanimity point of view according to which the planner’s judgements 
have to comply with a certain number of basic normative principles. We impose increasingly 
restrictive conditions on the household’s utility function and we investigate their effects on 
the resulting rankings of the distributions. This leads us to propose four dominance criteria 
that  can  be  used  for  providing  an  unambiguous  ranking  of  income  distributions  for 
heterogeneous populations. 
Keywords: Normative Analysis, Utilitarianism, Welfarism, Multidimensional Inequality and 
Welfare, Bidimensional Stochastic Dominance, Inequality Reducing Transformations. 
JEL: D31, D63, I31 
Reference to this paper: MOYES Patrick (2011) Comparisons of Heterogeneous Distributions and Dominance 
Criteria, Cahiers du GREThA, n°2011-23. 
 http://ideas.repec.org/p/grt/wpegrt/2011-23.html. 
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1. Introductory Remarks
It is generally considered that household income constitutes – under a number of conditions
– a reasonable indicator of a household’s well-being. The welfare or standard of living of a
society is then obtained by aggregating the citizens’ well-being by means of a social welfare
function. 1 The choice of one social welfare function rather than another constitutes a par-
ticular value judgement that is not necessarily unanimously approved. In order to limit the
arbitrariness of this choice, it is now a well-established tradition to consider a class of social
welfare functions rather than a particular social welfare function and to require a unanimity
of point of views among the elements in the class. A major diﬃculty with this approach is the
fact that the ranking of situations one obtains – attractive though it is from a normative per-
spective – is impossible to implement in practice because the class of social welfare functions
comprises an inﬁnite number of elements. Seminal work by Kolm (1969) and Atkinson (1970)
suggested a simple procedure for checking unanimity when one subscribes to some basic equity
requirements and when the distributions under comparison have equal means. Subsequently,
Shorrocks (1983) showed that their approach can be extended to the case where the equal
mean restriction is dispensed with, provided that one subscribes in addition to some eﬃciency
principle (see also Marshall and Olkin (1979)). Thus, the generalised Lorenz criterion has be-
come the appropriate criterion for comparing income distributions when elementary eﬃciency
and equity principles are agreed upon.
However, such a criterion can be meaningfully appealed to only if the income recipients can
be considered identical in all respects other than income. This is taken to mean that, leaving
income aside, one makes the judgement that the other attributes according to which individuals
might be distinguished should not be taken into account when assessing individuals’ well-
being. Such an assumption is called into question in most of the practical cases faced by the
economist, where the individuals diﬀer in non-income characteristics that are without question
considered as important factors inﬂuencing their well-being. Such is the case when the income
recipients are families or households who diﬀer in size and composition. It is indeed legitimate
to assume that size and composition of the households inﬂuence their needs, which in turn
aﬀect their ability to derive well-being from income. Another example is when comparisons
of income distributions are made across populations of persons with diﬀerent health statuses.
Here again it is plausible that health has an important impact on the determination of a
person’s well-being. In addition, it is no longer possible to invoke the lack of information to
justify the exclusive focus on income. The increasing availability of microdata sets provide the
researcher with reﬁned information at the individual level which can be exploited for making
welfare evaluations. A heterogeneous distribution, which indicates for every household its
income and demographic characteristics, is identiﬁed with a multidimensional distribution
and one may therefore be tempted to use the criteria proposed by Kolm (1977), Atkinson
and Bourguignon (1982) and Maasoumi (1986) among others. A diﬃculty, that makes these
criteria inappropriate in the present case, is the (implicit) assumption that the attributes are
perfectly divisible, which makes little sense for variables like family size, household composition
or health.
Two distinct routes have been taken when one is interested in comparing situations where
socio-demographic characteristics aﬀect the ability of households to produce well-being start-
1 Rigourously speaking, we should use the term social welfare functional rather than social welfare function.
By deﬁnition, a social welfare functional has as arguments the list of the agents’ utility functions and it
therefore takes explicitly into account the informational constraints, while a social welfare function uses the
particular utility levels attained by the agents in order to construct the social welfare ordering (see e.g. Sen
(1977), d’Aspremont (1985), d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002)).
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ing from given incomes. A longstanding practice for taking into account diﬀerences in needs
when making comparisons of welfare for heterogeneous populations consists in using equiva-
lence scales. After having chosen the reference household type – generally a single adult – one
determines for each household its equivalent income obtained by dividing its actual income
by a factor reﬂecting its needs. This procedure generates a ﬁctitious income distribution for a
homogeneous population consisting of single adults and one is thus taken back to the unidi-
mensional framework. Taking for granted that a unanimous agreement prevails concerning the
choice of the equivalence scale, two problems arise. 2 The ﬁrst problem is that the equivalence
scale adjustment method lacks sound theoretical foundations, so that one may be under the
impression that it is more or less an ad hoc procedure. 3 A second diﬃculty has to do with
the impact on inequality and social welfare of progressive transfers, i.e., the operation that
consists in taking income from a rich individual to give it to a poor one in such a way that
their relative positions are unchanged. Glewwe (1991) drew attention to the fact that such
transfers that reduce the inequalities of living standards between households do not necessarily
translate into a decrease in inequality at the level of society. 4
A second approach, initiated by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987), aims precisely at avoid-
ing this arbitrariness by allowing a large diversity of opinions. These authors showed that the
so-called sequential generalised Lorenz criterion permits one to unambiguously rank hetero-
geneous distributions provided one is willing to subscribe to a certain number of elementary
value judgements concerning the incidence of needs on the household’s standard of living.
However, the implementation of this criterion necessitates that a consensus prevails concern-
ing the ranking of needs. If we limit ourselves to the composition of the household, then this
might mean for instance that a couple with one child is needier that a couple without children
who in turn has more needs that a single adult. While it is illusory to pretend that such a
ranking of needs will be unanimously approved, the fact remains that it is a prerequisite for
implementing this approach. 5
Although the sequential generalised Lorenz criterion constitutes without doubt a break-
through for the comparison of heterogeneous situations, its practical signiﬁcance is limited to
the extent that by deﬁnition the populations of households involved must all have the same
structure in terms of needs. While this restriction does not pose problems when the focus is
on the comparisons of distributions before and after taxation, this is no longer the case when
one is interested in comparisons across countries or over time. Jenkins and Lambert (1993)
have proposed an adaptation of the sequential generalised Lorenz criterion that resolves this
2 Actually this unanimity is far from existing as the diversity of scales one ﬁnds in the literature can testify
(see e.g. Buhmann, Rainwater, Schmaus, and Smeeding (1988)). The fact that the choice of the scale is
not universally approved would not be too much a problem if it were shown to have no – or little – impact
on the extent of welfare, inequality and poverty for a given population,as well as on the ranking of societies
from these diﬀerent points of view. However, this is far from being the case, as a number of investigations
have demonstrated (see in particular Figini (1998)).
3 It is fair to note that Blackorby and Donaldson (1993) and Blundell and Lewbel (1991) have identiﬁed the
restrictions to be imposed on the households’ utility functions that the econometric estimation of equivalence
scales necessitates. Still a certain degree of arbitrariness remains concerning the type of scale – relative or
absolute scales, income independent or non-independent scales – to be chosen that cannot be justiﬁed
exclusively on theoretical grounds (see however Ebert and Moyes (2003)).
4 This diﬃculty originates in the choice of the weights associated with the equivalent incomes. Ebert and
Moyes (2003) have characterised the adjustment methods that avoid this diﬃculty.
5 If all households where composed only of perfectly identical adults, then such a ranking in terms of increasing
needs would be similar to the one obtained by considering the number of persons in the household. Things are
complicated by the fact that the household’s members diﬀer in many respects such as their age, their social
status or their health, many variables that make diﬃcult the construction of a unique complete ordering
over the set of household types.
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diﬃculty. However, their criterion, which involves the joint distributions of income and needs,
has the property that the marginal distributions of needs play little role in the determination
of the ranking of situations. Suppose that there are only two types: single adults and house-
holds composed of two adults. Consider two societies S1 and S2 such that the distributions
of income for each type are identical in both situations and such that there are twice as many
couples and half as many singles in society S1 than in society S2. Then, the application of
Jenkins and Lambert (1993)’s criterion indicates that societies S1 and S2 have the same living
standards, while one intuitively expects that S2 would dominate S1. Furthermore, the corre-
sponding class of social welfare functions is not perfectly identiﬁed since the restrictions placed
on the utility functions are only shown to be suﬃcient for utilitarian unanimity to imply their
criterion. The fact that these restrictions are also necessary for the application of unanimity
to be consistent with the Jenkins-Lambert criterion has been demonstrated by Chambaz and
Maurin (1998). Nevertheless, the criticism which concerns the independence of the ranking of
situations with respect to the marginal distributions of needs still applies.
The main purpose of this paper is to reveal the implicit value judgements that underlie
the diﬀerent dominance criteria one can propose for comparing situations where households
can be distinguished on the basis of increasing needs. We will suppose throughout that the
evaluation of social welfare is performed by means of a utilitarian social welfare function so
that social welfare is simply equal to the sum of the households’ well-beings. The well-being
or living standard of a household will depend both on its income and needs, which implies
that one is always able (i) to fully order needs on an increasing scale, and (ii) to associate
to each household a position on this ordinal scale. Implicitly, we assimilate neediness with a
handicap with the convention that, for a given income, the production of well-being by the
household decreases with its size. Rather than reasoning in terms of neediness – increasing
with the number of persons in the household – one can equally argue in terms of ability which
is decreasing with family size. This approach, based on the notions of neediness or of ability,
does not take into consideration the decisions for a couple to have children or not. It is a
paternalistic approach where a sympathetic ethical observer (i) evaluates in a ﬁrst stage the
well-being of each household on the basis of its income and family composition according to
the principle of extended sympathy, and (ii) uses this information in a second stage in order
to determine the society’s welfare by means of the utilitarian rule. The value judgements of
our ethical observer constitute as many conditions imposed on the household utility function
as it is conceived by her. This allows one to distinguish diﬀerent classes of admissible utility
functions and then in conformity with the principle of unanimity applied to the utilitarian
rule, to identify the corresponding dominance criteria.
We introduce in Section 2 the general framework and the main notation that we will use
throughout the paper. Unlike our predecessors we identify a situation – or equivalently a
heterogeneous distribution – with a joint distribution of income and ability. This way of
proceeding will ﬁnd its justiﬁcation later on when we introduce the dominance criteria. The
following two sections contain the main results and present the characterisations of the diﬀer-
ent dominance criteria that generalise the usual stochastic dominance criteria. Following the
approach of Hardy, Littlewood, and Pólya (1952), we will in a ﬁrst stage identify those modi-
ﬁcations of the situations – the so-called elementary transformations – which from the point
of view of our ethical observer improve social welfare. We will then look for the conditions
that the household utility function must satisfy in order to ensure that the application of the
utilitarian rule concludes that social welfare has increased as a result of such transformations.
These conditions will allow us to deﬁne classes of household utility functions and we will show
that the application of utilitarian unanimity to each of these classes permits one to charac-
terise multidimensional stochastic dominance criteria. The ordinal or cardinal character of the
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concepts of neediness and ability will prove to play a crucial role for the characterisation of the
dominance criteria. We suppose in Section 3 that the notion of needs is purely ordinal, while
we admit in Section 4 that making comparisons of diﬀerences of ability between households of
diﬀerent types has some meaning. We discuss in Section 5 the approach advocated by Jenkins
and Lambert (1993) and we show that the dominance criteria they proposed violate a mini-
mal consistency requirement quite close in spirit to the condition of independence of irrelevant
alternatives in social choice theory. Section 6 concludes the paper by summarising our main
ﬁndings, pointing at limitations and suggesting avenues for further research. In order to keep
technicalities to a minimum in the course of the exposition, the proofs of the main results are
relegated to an Appendix.
2. Preliminary Deﬁnitions and Notation
We consider a population or society S := {1,2,...,n} comprising n households, where each
household is described by two attributes: income and family composition or household type.
We assume that there exists a ﬁnite number of household types H (2 5 H 5 n) and we denote
by H := {1,2,...,H} the set of possible types. In this paper, we interpret the index h ∈ H
as an (ordinal) indicator of household ability, which is decreasing with family size. As a matter
of illustration, one might conceive of the following correspondence between ability, needs and
household composition:
Household Composition A C C + 1 C + 2 C + 3 C + 4
Ability h 6 5 4 3 2 1
Neediness H − h + 1 1 2 3 4 5 6
where the symbols “A” indicate a household comprising a single adult, “C” a household
constituted of a married couple, and “C + K” a household constituted of a married couple
with K children. 6 A heterogeneous distribution or situation is a partitioned vector s ≡ (x;a) :
= (x1,...,xn;a1,...,an), where xi ∈ D := [v,v ] ⊂ R and ai ∈ H represent respectively the
income and ability of household i. We denote as
(2.1) Z := {s ≡ (x;a) | xi ∈ D and ai ∈ H , for all i ∈ S}
the set of heterogeneous distributions. It is convenient to conceive of distribution s ≡ (x;a) ∈
Z as a matrix with n rows and 2 columns























If we limit ourselves to a ﬁxed population of households – or equivalently populations of the
same size – then a situation s ∈ Z can be visualised as a scatterplot in the space D × H
6 This way of proceeding amounts to identifying family size with a handicap for the household in the same way
that poor health constitutes a handicap for a person. This point of view, which, for instance, does not take
into consideration the decision for a couple to have children is with no doubt disputable. An approach that
would take explicitly into account the well-being that the parents can derive from the presence of children
lies outside of the scope of the present paper.
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where the point si ≡ (xi;ai) identiﬁes household i. Consider for instance the population
















































where we have made use of the conventions mentioned above concerning the correspondence
between ability and family composition. Denoting by i◦ and i∗ the situations of household i
Figure 2.1: Graphical representation of situations s∗ and s◦

































in states s◦ and s∗, respectively, we have the situation depicted in Figure 2.1.
The diﬀerent dominance criteria that we will introduce later on generalise the usual stochas-
tic dominance quasi-orderings and will therefore involve the joint distribution functions. Let
us associate to situation s ≡ (x;a) ∈ Z its joint distribution function F(y,h) which indicates







f(ξ,r)dξ, ∀ h ∈ H , ∀ y ∈ D,
where f(y,h) is the joint density function associated to situation s ≡ (x;a) ∈ Z . 7 The
corresponding marginal distribution of income is indicated by F(y,H), while F(v,h) denotes
7 Since the heterogeneous distributions are discrete, this representation is not perfectly correct to the extent
that the distribution function presents discontinuities for some income values. However, this presentation
can be justiﬁed on the basis of arguments developed in Fishburn and Vickson (1978).
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the marginal distribution of ability. 8 Given two situations s◦ ≡ (x◦;a◦),s∗ ≡ (x∗;a∗) ∈ Z , we
will henceforth use f◦ and f∗ (resp. F ◦ and F ∗) to indicate their density (resp. distribution)
functions.
Following Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987), we assume that the sympathetic ethical ob-
server relies on the (average) utilitarian social welfare function in order to compare the distri-
butions of well-being between diﬀerent societies. The social welfare in situation s ≡ (x;a) ∈ Z













where U(y,h) is – from the point of view of the ethical observer – the utility obtained by a
household with ability h and income y. We interpret U(y,h) as a measure of the well-being of
a household of type h, which we identify with the maximum utility a representative member
of the household gets when the household is given income y. It therefore depends on the way
the household’s members distribute resources among them. For instance, if the household
maximises a symmetric, monotone and quasi-concave function of the utilities of its members
and if the latter have the same individual utility function, then U(y,h) is the utility level that
all persons in the household will get. A discussion of the underlying model goes far beyond
the scope of the present paper and we refer the interested reader to Blackorby and Donaldson
(1993), Bourguignon (1989), and more recently Ebert and Moyes (2009), where these questions
are discussed in more detail. Because the list of abilities is ﬁxed throughout, we may interpret
U(·,h) as the utility function of a type h-household. To simplify things, we assume that the
household utility function is continuous and diﬀerentiable to the required order with respect
to income and we denote by U the set of such functions. The social welfare function being
decided once and for all, the choice of the utility function U deﬁnes a (complete) ordering of
the situations under comparison such that:
(2.6) ∀ s
◦,s





It must be noted that the ranking deﬁned above is invariant with respect to speciﬁc trans-
formations of the households’ utility functions. More precisely, if V (xi,ai) = αi + β U(xi,ai)
(β > 0), for all i = 1,2,...,n, then
(2.7) ∀ s
◦,s





This informational restriction – known as cardinal unit comparability – only requires that com-
parisons of utility diﬀerences between households are meaningful. Initially, this informational
requirement was introduced in the social choice framework where individuals – here households
– have possibly distinct utility functions (see e.g. Sen (1977), d’Aspremont (1985)). Since we
implicitly assume in (2.5) that Ui(xi,ai) = U(xi,ai), for all i = 1,2,...,n and all s ≡ (x;a)
– all households have the same utility function – we must have αi = α, for all i = 1,2,...,n.
Thus, in our speciﬁc context, cardinal unit comparability reduces to cardinal full comparability
and diﬀerences of utilities as well as levels of utilities are comparable between households. 9
8 It is possible to use the conditional distribution function of income F(y |h) rather than the joint distribution
functions F(y,h) as our predecessors have done. However, the recourse to the joint distribution functions
comes naturally in a context where the distributions of household types vary from one population to an-
other. Furthermore, the statistical tests that will allow one to implement our criteria will involve the joint
distribution functions.
9 As we will see later on, the possibility of making comparisons of utility levels across households is a crucial
step towards the construction of our dominance criteria.
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In order to limit the arbitrariness inherent in the choice of the utility function, we will
suppose that the ethical observer bases her assessment of the diﬀerent situations under com-
parison not on a particular utility function but rather on the basis of a set of utility functions
that one can consider as reasonable. Letting U ∗ indicate such a class, we have the following
(partial) ranking of situations:
(2.8) ∀ s
◦,s
∗ ∈ Z : s
∗ ≥U ∗ s
◦ ⇐⇒ WU(s
∗) = WU(s
◦), ∀ U ∈ U
∗.
This ranking, which represents the unanimity point of view when we limit ourselves to the
class U ∗, will quite naturally depend on the restrictions that the class U ∗ imposes on its
elements. This paper aims at introducing successively more stringent restrictions on the
household utility function and at examining the implications for the ranking of the situations
under comparison as deﬁned in (2.8). Finally, we would like to emphasise that we can with no
loss of generality restrict attention to comparisons of situations for populations of equal sizes.
Indeed, by deﬁnition, the social welfare function (2.5) satisﬁes to the principle of population
according to which welfare does not change under a replication of the population. 10 The
application of this principle allows us to make comparisons of well-being across populations of
distinct sizes by replicating in a suitable way the corresponding heterogeneous distributions
and by applying to the resulting equal sized situations the unanimity criterion deﬁned in (2.8).
3. Dominance Criteria with Ordinal Abilities
One can enter into endless debates about the question of whether ability is an ordinal or a
cardinal concept just as one might discuss the ordinal or cardinal meaning of IQ. More relevant
is the fundamental question of the meaning of the notion of ability or equivalently of that of
needs. Actually, the notion of ability only makes sense when the objective of the household is
one of producing well-being. The idea is that one household type is more able – or equivalently
has less needs – than another if, at any given income level, the utility it manages to achieve
is higher than the utility attained by the other type. Ability is then an ordinal variable if we
consider that only comparisons of utility levels between household types make sense. 11 In
other words, while it makes sense to say that a couple with one child is needier than a childless
couple, claiming that the diﬀerence of needs between these two households is greater than the
diﬀerence of needs between a couple with no children and a single person is meaningless.
Definition 3.1 Given two situations s◦,s∗ ∈ Z , we will say that s∗ is obtained from s◦ by







r, for all r ∈ S (r 6= i). Equivalently, we would say that s◦ is obtained from s∗
by means of an ability decrement.
The notion of an ability increment is illustrated in Figure 3.1, where we depict schematically
two situations s◦ and s∗ that diﬀer only in the ability level attained by household h which
increases from h to k when going from situation s◦ to situation s∗. The notion of an ability
increment is a convenient ﬁction, which strictly speaking is only meaningful in the case of
distinct populations, like diﬀerent countries for instance. Identifying modiﬁcations of family
composition in the course of time with such transformations is disputable to the extent that
these changes were chosen by the household – one may think of decisions like marrying or
10We will say that situation s∗ is a q-replication of situation s◦ if there exists q = 2 such that s∗ = (s◦;...;s◦) ∈
Z q. Then, the principle of population states: for all s◦,s∗ ∈
S∞
m=1 Z m, if s∗ is a q-replication of situation
s◦, then WU(s∗) = WU(s◦).
11This indirect way of deﬁning the ordinal or cardinal nature of ability arises from the relationship between
household well-being and ability.
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having children – and therefore lie outside the domain of evaluation of the ethical observer.
One can easily check that it is suﬃcient for welfare not to decrease as the result of an ability
increment that the utility function is non-decreasing with ability. More precisely:
C1 U(y,h) 5 U(y,h + 1), ∀ y ∈ D, ∀ h = 1,2,...,H − 1.
Indeed, let us assume that s∗ follows from s◦ by means of an ability increment as it is deﬁned
in Figure 3.1. Then, welfare will not diminish when we go from situation s◦ to situation s∗ if







[U(u,h + r + 1) − U(u,h + r)] = 0,
which follows from condition C1. 12
Definition 3.2 Given two situations s◦,s∗ ∈ Z , we will say that s∗ is obtained from s◦ by







r, for all r ∈ S (r 6= i). Equivalently, we would say that s◦ is obtained from s∗
by means of an income decrement.
We have represented an income increment in Figure 3.2 and, here again, it is immediate that
social welfare will not decrease as the result of an income increment provided that the utility
function is non-decreasing with income, and this holds whatever the ability level. Formally,
this condition is stated as:
C2 Uy(y,h) = 0, ∀ y ∈ D, ∀ h ∈ H ,
where Uy(y,h) denotes the ﬁrst (partial) derivative of U(y,h)with respect to income. Suppose
that s∗ is obtained from s◦ by means of the income increment depicted in Figure 3.2. Then,









Uy(u + ξ,h)dξ = 0,
12Condition C1 would not be appropriate if U(y,h) were interpreted as being total household utility and h is
inversely related to household size: for more on this see e.g. Fleurbaey, Hagneré, and Trannoy (2007).
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where ∆ := v − u > 0, and condition C2 is suﬃcient for (3.2) to hold.
The preceding conditions do not incorporate any consideration of distributive justice, like
for instance the pursuit of greater equality. While the notion of inequality reduction is well
understood for homogeneous populations, this is far from being the case in our heterogeneous
context where households diﬀer both in income and family composition. The elementary trans-
formation we introduce below is the foundation of the approach of Atkinson and Bourguignon
(1982, 1987).
Definition 3.3 Given two situations s◦,s∗ ∈ Z , we will say that s∗ is obtained from s◦ by









j; and (iii) s◦
r = s∗
r, for all r 6= i,j. Equivalently,
we would say that s◦ is obtained from s∗ by means of an unfavourable permutation.
Intuitively, a favourable permutation contributes to a reduction in the inequalities between
the two households involved. We verify in Figure 3.3 that in situation s◦ household i is
at the same time poorer and needier than household j. It follows that, from the ethical
observer’s point of view, household i’s well-being will always be smaller – and in any case
not greater – than household j’s well-being as long as the utility functions verify conditions
C1 and C2. A favourable permutation consists in using income in order to compensate for
diﬀerences in well-being of the two households by permuting the incomes of the rich and
poor households as indicated in Figure 3.3. Such a transformation actually combines an
income increment and an income decrement of the same magnitude – equal to the income
diﬀerence between the rich and the poor households – with the additional constraint that
the income of the beneﬁciary household after the transformation is equal to the income of
donor household before the transformation. This is the interpretation given by Atkinson and
Bourguignon (1987) when the demographic structure of the population is ﬁxed: income is the
only attribute whose distribution can be altered in order to reduce the diﬀerences in well-
being between the households. In our less restrictive framework, one can equally interpret a
favourable permutation as an exchange of abilities between households i and j.
One can easily check that social welfare will not decrease as the result of a favourable
permutation provided that the marginal utility of income is non-increasing with ability, which
can be formally stated as:
C3 Uy(y,h) = Uy(y,h + 1), ∀ y ∈ D, ∀ h = 1,2,...,H − 1.
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Suppose that social welfare does not decrease as the result of a favourable permutation as
described in Figure 3.3, in which case one has







[Uy(u + ξ,h + r + 1) − Uy(u + ξ,h + r)]dξ = 0,
where ∆ := v−u > 0. Clearly, condition C3 is suﬃcient for the weak inequality (3.3) to hold.
It is convenient to introduce the following class of utility functions:
(3.4) U11 := {U ∈ U | conditions C1, C2 and C3 are fulﬁlled}.
We will say that situation s∗ results from situation s◦ by means of a T11-transformation if s∗
can be obtained from s◦ by means of an ability increment and/or an income increment and/or
a favourable permutation. Then, we have:
Remark 3.1 Social welfare does not decrease as the result of a T11-transformation if and only
if U ∈ U11. 13
Proof. We have already shown that U ∈ U11 is a suﬃcient condition for social welfare not
to decrease as the result of a T11-transformation. In order to prove that it is also necessary,
we will argue a contrario and show that, if either condition C1, C2 or C3 is not fulﬁlled, then
it is possible to ﬁnd two situations s◦,s∗ ∈ Z such that s∗ is obtained from s◦ by means of a
T11-transformation and WU(s∗) < WU(s◦). Suppose for example that condition C3 is violated,
so that there exists y ∈ D and h ∈ {1,2,...,H−1} such that Uy(y,h) < Uy(y,h+1). Consider
then the situations s◦ and s∗ deﬁned in Figure 3.3 with k = h + 1. Choosing ∆ := v − u > 0







= Uy(u,h) − Uy(u,h + 1) < 0,
13This result depends crucially on the deﬁnition of the T11-transformation. We would like to draw attention to
the fact that one cannot conclude that, if social welfare does not decrease for all utility functions U ∈ U11,
then s∗ can be derived from s◦ by means of a ﬁnite sequence of ability increments, income increments and/or
favourable permutations. This is – to the best of our knowledge – a conjecture that has not yet been proven,
even though there are results in the literature that are making steps in this direction (see e.g. Epstein and
Tanny (1980), Gravel and Moyes (2010)).
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which indicates that social welfare decreases as the result of a favourable permutation and,
therefore, as the result of a T11-transformation. We do not reproduce the proofs when condi-
tions C1 and C2 are not satisﬁed since they are similar in all respects.
We will assume that the ethical observer subscribes to the value judgements embedded
in conditions C1, C2 and C3. In order to avoid as much arbitrariness as possible, we will
conform to the unanimity principle according to which situation s∗ is considered better than
situation s◦ if, whatever the utility function verifying conditions C1, C2 and C3, the utilitarian
rule never ranks s∗ below s◦. Attractive as it is, this way of proceeding raises however the
practical question of its implementation as it is impossible to verify directly if it applies or not.
The following result proposes a simple procedure in order to decide whether one situation is
preferable or not to another when attention is restricted to utility functions in the class U11.
Proposition 3.1 Consider two situations s◦,s∗ ∈ Z . The following two statements are
equivalent:
(a) WU(s∗) = WU(s◦), ∀ U ∈ U11.
(b) F ∗(y,h) 5 F ◦(y,h), ∀ y ∈ D, ∀ h ∈ H .
Condition P3.1b is nothing more than a condition of multidimensional stochastic domi-
nance in the particular case where one of the variables – here ability – is discrete and ordinal.
We refer the reader to Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) or Appendix B for a presentation
of multidimensional stochastic dominance criteria in the case of continuous and cardinal at-
tributes. Whatever the ability and income levels, the proportion of households with abilities
and incomes not greater than these levels is no larger in situation s∗ than in situation s◦. This
implies in particular that the distribution of income for the whole population in situation s∗
must stochastically dominate to the ﬁrst order the corresponding distribution in situation s◦.
Indeed, for h = H, condition P3.1b reduces to F ∗(y,H) 5 F ◦(y,H), for all y ∈ D. Making
use of the relationship between stochastic dominance and poverty measurement (see Foster
and Shorrocks (1988)), this means that, whatever the poverty line, there must – all types
of households combined – be proportionally no more poor households in s∗ than in situation
s◦. Similarly, setting y = v, we obtain F ∗(v,h) 5 F ◦(v,h), for all h ∈ H . In other words,
whatever the ability level, the proportion of households whose ability falls below that level in
situation s∗ cannot exceed the proportion of households in situation s◦ who are in the same
position. While dominance in terms of the marginal distributions of income and ability are
necessary for condition P3.1b to hold, they are far from being suﬃcient. 14
It is standard practice in the case of homogeneous populations to consider that, other things
equal, a transfer of income from a rich individual to a poorer one contributes to an increase in
social welfare. The so-called Pigou-Dalton condition or principle of transfers constitutes the
cornerstone of the theory of inequality and welfare measurement in a homogeneous framework.
It is quite natural to require that a multidimensional measure of welfare also veriﬁes this
condition and to this aim we introduce the following adaptation of the notion of a progressive
transfer in our context.
Definition 3.4 Given two situations s◦,s∗ ∈ Z , we will say that s∗ is obtained from s◦ by
means of an progressive income transfer if there exists two households i,j ∈ S (i 6= j) such
14There is however one case where the conditions on the marginal distributions are necessary and suﬃcient for
utilitarian unanimity to hold for all utility functions in U11. It is when the utility functions are separable in
the sense that U(y,h) := φ(y) + ψ(h), for all y ∈ D and all h ∈ H . One can easily check in this case that
conditions C1, C2 and C3 are satisﬁed as long as the functions φ and ψ are non-decreasing. However, one
gets in this particular case Uy(y,h) = Uy(y,h + 1), for all y ∈ D and all h = 1,2,...,H − 1, which implies
that favourable – as well as unfavourable – permutations have no impact on social welfare.


















r, for all r 6= i,j. Equivalently, we would say that s◦ is obtained from s∗ by means of
an regressive income transfer.
The notion of progressive income transfer is illustrated in Figure 3.4, where v−u = t−w. It
is well-known that the concavity of the utility function is a suﬃcient (and necessary) condition
for welfare not to diminish as the result of a progressive transfer in the homogeneous case.
In our multidimensional setting, this condition naturally translates into the requirement that
Figure 3.4: A progressive income transfer
d d - 















the household utility function is concave in income for any given level of ability, which, upon
making use of the diﬀerentiability with respect to income of the household utility function, is
stated as:
C4 Uyy(y,h) 5 0, ∀ y ∈ D, ∀ h ∈ H ,
where Uyy(y,h) is the second derivative of U(y,h) with respect to income. For a proof suppose
that social welfare does not decrease as the result of a progressive income transfer as deﬁned
in Figure 3.4 so that







Uyy(u + ϑ + ξ,h)dϑdξ = 0,
where ∆ := v − u = t − w > 0 and  := w − u > 0. Clearly, condition C4 is suﬃcient for the
preceding inequality to hold.
Building upon the idea of compensation once again, one might argue that other things equal
a progressive income transfer between two households of the same type will increase social
welfare all the more if the households involved are needier. The following transformation will
help make this idea more precise:
Definition 3.5 Given two situations s◦,s∗ ∈ Z , we will say that s∗ is obtained from s◦ by
means of a favourable composite income permutation if there exist four households i,j,g,` ∈ S























`; and (v) s◦
r = s∗
r, for all r 6= i,j,g,`.
Equivalently, we would say that s◦ is obtained from s∗ by means of an unfavourable composite
income permutation.
The preceding deﬁnition might look abstruse at ﬁrst glance and Figure 3.5 shows what
a favourable composite income permutation looks like. It clearly shows that a favourable
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composite income permutation combines a favourable permutation and a unfavourable per-
mutation of the same magnitude, the former involving lower incomes than the latter. The
idea is that the positive eﬀect on social welfare of the favourable permutation more than
oﬀsets the negative impact of the unfavourable permutation. But Figure 3.5 also suggests


























another interpretation: a favourable composite income permutation can be decomposed into
(i) a progressive income transfer between households i and ` who are of type h and (ii) a
regressive income transfer between households j and g of type k, where both transfers are of
the same magnitude. The reduction in inequality resulting from the progressive transfer of
income between the households of low ability outweighs the increase in inequality caused by
the regressive transfer taking place between the households of higher ability.
It can be shown that social welfare never diminishes following a favourable composite income
permutation if the second partial derivative of the household utility function with respect to
income is non-decreasing with ability, or more precisely:
C5 Uyy(y,h) 5 Uyy(y,h + 1), ∀ y ∈ D, ∀ h = 1,2,...,H − 1.
Suppose that situation s∗ is obtained from situation s◦ by means of a favourable compos-
ite income permutation as described in Figure 3.5 and that this results in a social welfare
improvement. We have









[Uyy(u + ϑ + ξ,h + r + 1)−Uyy(u + ϑ + ξ,h + r)]dϑdξ = 0,
where ∆ := v − u = t − w > 0 and  := w − u > 0. Clearly, condition C5 is suﬃcient for
inequality (3.7) to hold. It is convenient to introduce the following class of utility functions:
(3.8) U12 := {U ∈ U | conditions C1, C2, C3, C4 and C5 are fulﬁlled}.
We will say that situation s∗ results from situation s◦ by means of a T12-transformation if s∗
can be obtained from s◦ by means of an ability increment and/or an income increment and/or
a favourable permutation and/or a progressive income transfer and/or a favourable composite
income permutation. Then, we have:
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Remark 3.2 Social welfare does not decrease as the result of a T12-transformation if and only
if U ∈ U12.
Proof. It follows from the discussion above that U ∈ U12 is a suﬃcient condition for social
welfare not to decrease as the result of a T12-transformation. In order to prove that it is
also necessary, we argue a contrario and show that, if any of the conditions C1, C2, C3, C4
or C5 is not fulﬁlled, then there exists two situations s◦,s∗ ∈ Z such that s∗ is obtained
from s◦ by means of a T12-transformation but WU(s∗) < WU(s◦). Suppose that condition
C5 does not hold, in which case there exists y ∈ D and h ∈ {1,2,...,H − 1} such that
Uyy(y,h) > Uyy(y,h + 1). Consider then the situations s◦ and s∗ deﬁned in Figure 3.5 with







= Uyy(u,h + 1) − Uyy(u,h) < 0,
which demonstrates that social welfare decreases as the result of a favourable composite income
permutation and by a way of consequence as the result of a T12-transformation. We would
arrive at the same result when any of the conditions C1 to C4 does not hold by choosing
appropriately the situations s◦ and s∗.
Here again we assume that the ethical observer shares the ethical value judgments captured
by conditions C1 to C5 and ranks the situations under comparison on the basis of the utilitarian
unanimity principle. The result below identiﬁes a simple procedure for deciding when one
situation is preferable to another when attention is restricted to utility functions in the class
U12.
Proposition 3.2 Consider two situations s◦,s∗ ∈ Z . Statements (a) and (b) below are
equivalent:
(a) WU(s∗) = WU(s◦), ∀ U ∈ U12.









◦(ξ,h)dξ, ∀ y ∈ D, ∀ h ∈ H .
Condition P3.2b2 actually corresponds to the sequential generalised Lorenz dominance
criterion introduced by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) in the particular case where the
marginal distribution of ability is ﬁxed. It requires that the distribution of income for those
households whose ability does not exceed h in situation s∗ stochastically dominates to the
second order the corresponding income distribution in situation s◦, and this holds whatever
the level h of ability considered. But, contrary to Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987)’s criterion,
the proportions of households whose abilities are no greater than h may be diﬀerent in the two
situations. However, while it is necessary, condition P3.2b2 is not suﬃcient for guaranteeing
a non-ambiguous increase in social welfare, given the conditions maintained for the household
utility function. One has actually to add a condition on the marginal distribution of ability,
namely condition P3.2b1: whatever the level of ability, the proportion of households with
abilities no greater than this level is no larger in situation s∗ than in situation s◦.
Drawing upon Shorrocks and Foster (1987), it would be possible to impose additional
restrictions on the household utility function in order to increase the discriminatory power of
the dominance criteria. One would then obtain conditions similar to those in Proposition 3.2













◦(ϑ,h)dϑdξ, ∀ y ∈ D, ∀ h ∈ H ,
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and where one requires in addition that the third derivative of the utility function with re-
spect to income is non-negative and non-increasing with ability. Lambert and Ramos (2002)
obtained a related result but without imposing the condition on the marginal distributions of
ability as we have done in Proposition 3.2. This is achieved at the cost of replacing condition
C1 with a stronger property which actually raises diﬃculties as we will argue in Section 5.
Insofar as the corresponding properties of the utility function are not that transparent, we
would rather explore another direction by introducing a certain degree of cardinalism into the
analysis.
4. Dominance Criteria with Cardinal Abilities
So far ability has been treated as a purely ordinal concept so that comparisons of ability
diﬀerences or ratios were meaningless. While avoiding any recourse to any equivalence scale,
one might think of introducing some degree of cardinalism into the analysis. The idea is that,
for a given income, making comparisons of utility diﬀerences between households of diﬀerent
types is not totally nonsensical. For instance, we might consider that, for a given income, the
diﬀerence in utility between a household of type h + 1 and a household of type h is smaller
the diﬀerence in utility between households of types h+2 and h+1. This value judgement –
assuming that the list of abilities is ﬁxed once for all and that abilities are totally ordered –
introduces a degree of cardinalism into the measurement of household well-being and implicitly


























15Patrick Moyes/Comparisons of Heterogeneous Distributions and Dominance Criteria
in the concept of ability. 15
Definition 4.1 Given two situations s◦,s∗ ∈ Z , we will say that s∗ is obtained from s◦ by


















r, for all r 6= i,j. Equivalently, we would say that s◦ is obtained from s∗ by means of
an regressive ability transfer.
The notion of a progressive ability transfer is illustrated in Figure 4.1. Making the value
judgement that a progressive ability transfer results in a social welfare improvement amounts
to imposing the following condition on the household utility function:
C6 U(y,h + 2) − 2U(y,h + 1) + U(y,h) 5 0, ∀ y ∈ D, ∀ h = 1,2,...,H − 2.
Indeed, one can easily verify that social welfare does not decrease as the result of a progressive
ability transfer if condition C6 is fulﬁlled. Consider the situations s∗ and s◦ depicted in Figure
4.1 and suppose further that







[U(u,h+p+r +2)−2U(u,h+p+r +1)+U(u,h+p+r)] = 0.
Clearly, inequality (4.1) will hold if condition C6 is fulﬁlled. Condition C6 – non-increasing
utility diﬀerences with respect to ability – is the counterpart for ability of condition C4. 16
Definition 4.2 Given two situations s◦,s∗ ∈ Z , we will say that s∗ is obtained from s◦ by
means of a favourable composite ability permutation if there exist four households i,j,g,` ∈ S























`; and (v) s◦
r = s∗
r, for all r 6= i,j,g,`.
Equivalently, we would say that s◦ is obtained from s∗ by means of a unfavourable composite
ability permutation.
The preceding deﬁnition is illustrated in Figure 4.2 which shows that a favourable com-
posite ability permutation is the result of the combination of a progressive ability transfer
and of a regressive ability transfer where the households involved in the ﬁrst transfer have a
lower income than those taking part in the second. But Figure 4.2 suggests also another inter-
pretation: a favourable composite ability permutation can be decomposed into a favourable
permutation involving types h and h + q and an unfavourable permutation between types k
and k+q. The idea, at the very foundation of this kind of transformation, is that the increase
in social welfare resulting from the progressive ability transfer (resp. favourable permutation)
overcompensates for the decrease in social welfare caused by the regressive ability transfer
(resp. unfavourable permutation).
As we will show, the following property of the household utility function is closely related
to progressive ability transfers:
C7 Uy(y,h + 2) − 2Uy(y,h + 1) + Uy(y,h) = 0, ∀ y ∈ D, ∀ h = 1,2,...,H − 2.
15The condition that the marginal utility of income is non-increasing with household size – or equivalently
non-decreasing with ability – is inseparable from the way the households types and the corresponding list
of abilities are deﬁned.
16The condition of non-increasing utility diﬀerences with respect to ability is reminiscent of the notion of
concavity in integers (see Marshall and Olkin (1979, Chapter 16)).
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Indeed, suppose we want social welfare not to decrease as the result of a progressive ability











   
   
Uy(u + ξ,h + p + r + 2)
−2Uy(u + ξ,h + p + r + 1)
+Uy(u + ξ,h + p + r)

   
   
dξ = 0,
where ∆ := v − u > 0, which establishes suﬃciency of condition C7. For later reference we
introduce
(4.3) U21 := {U ∈ U | conditions C1, C2, C3, C6 and C7 are fulﬁlled}.
The classes U21 and U12 have in common the fact that the utility functions that constitute
them are non-decreasing in both ability and income and have marginal utility of income non-
increasing with ability. Both also involve progressive transfers and favourable permutations,
but diﬀer with respect to the attribute that is involved in these transformations: income in
the case of U12 and ability in the case of U21.
We will say that situation s∗ results from situation s◦ by means of a T21-transformation if s∗
can be obtained from s◦ by means of an ability increment and/or an income increment and/or
a favourable permutation and/or a progressive ability transfer and/or a favourable composite
ability permutation. Then, we have:
Remark 4.1 Social welfare does not decrease as the result of a T21-transformation if and only
if U ∈ U21.
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Proof. It follows from the discussion above that U ∈ U21 is a suﬃcient condition for social
welfare not to decrease as the result of a T21-transformation. In order to prove that it is
also necessary, we argue a contrario and show that, if any of the conditions C1, C2, C3, C6
or C7 is not fulﬁlled, then there exist two situations s◦,s∗ ∈ Z such that s∗ is obtained
from s◦ by means of a T21-transformation but WU(s∗) < WU(s◦). Suppose for instance that
condition C7 is violated in which case there exists y ∈ D and h ∈ {1,2,...,H − 1} such that
Uy(y,h + 2) − 2Uy(y,h + 1) + Uy(y,h) < 0. Consider then the situations s◦ and s∗ depicted










[Uy(u,h + 2) − 2Uy(u,h + 1) + Uy(u,h)] < 0,
and we conclude that social welfare has decreased as the result of a favourable composite
ability permutation and, as a consequence as the result of a T21-transformation. We would
arrive at the same result when any of the conditions C1 to C3 and C6 does not hold by
choosing appropriately the situations s◦ and s∗.
Suppose that the utilitarian ethical observer subscribes to the value judgements embedded
in conditions C1, C2, C3, C6 and C7. The next result identiﬁes a simple procedure in order to
decide when one situation is better than another according to utilitarian unanimity restricted
to the class U21.
Proposition 4.1 Consider two situations s◦,s∗ ∈ Z . Statements (a) and (b) below are
equivalent:
(a) WU(s∗) = WU(s◦), ∀ U ∈ U21.









◦(y,r), ∀ y ∈ D, ∀ h ∈ H .
Condition P4.1b1 means that – considering all household types combined – the distribution
of income in situation s∗ stochastically dominates to the ﬁrst order the distribution of income
in situation s◦. Making use of the relationship between poverty and stochastic dominance
(see Foster and Shorrocks (1988)), we conclude that, whatever the poverty line, there are no
more poor households in situation s∗ than in situation s◦. Condition P4.1b2, which concerns
the joint distributions of income and ability, is more diﬃcult to interpret. It requires that
the distribution of ability for those households whose income does not exceed y in situation
s∗ stochastically dominates to the second order the corresponding distribution of ability in
situation s◦, and this holds whatever the level y of income considered. In the particular case
where y = v, it amounts to a second degree stochastic dominance ranking of the marginal
distributions of ability.
Proposition 3.2 and Proposition 4.1 actually mirror each other: both results impose a
ﬁrst order stochastic dominance condition and a (partial) second order stochastic dominance
condition. In the case of Proposition 3.2 the ﬁrst order stochastic dominance test concerns
the marginal distributions of ability, while in the case of Proposition 4.1 it is applied to the
marginal distributions of income. Similarly, the second order stochastic dominance test applies
to the distributions of income evaluated at every level of ability in the case of Proposition 3.2,
while it is the distributions of ability evaluated at every income level that are subjected to the
test in the case of Proposition 4.1.
The composite permutations we have examined up to now are permutations in only one
dimension: either income, or ability. This restricts the possibilities open for transforming the
situations and our next transformation is freed from this constraint.
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Definition 4.3 Given two situations s◦,s∗ ∈ Z , we will say that s∗ is obtained from s◦
by means of a favourable composite permutation if there exist four households i,j,g,` ∈ S
































r, for all r 6= i,j,g,`. Equivalently, we would say that s◦ is obtained from s∗ by means
of a unfavourable composite permutation.
A typical favourable composite permutation is represented in Figure 4.3, which shows that
such a transformation can be interpreted as the combination of a favourable permutation and a
unfavourable permutation of the same magnitude, where the favourable permutation involves
households who are at the same time poorer and less able than the households taking part in
the unfavourable permutation. Actually, all three of the favourable composite permutations we


































have considered combine favourable and unfavourable permutations, but it is the favourable
composite permutation which imposes the least restrictions on the way the permutations have
to be combined.
The following property of the household utility function ensures that social welfare cannot
decrease as the result of a favourable composite permutation:
C8 Uyy(y,h + 2) − 2Uyy(y,h + 1) + Uyy(y,h) 5 0, ∀ y ∈ D, ∀ h = 1,2,...,H − 2.
To show this, suppose that situation s∗ is obtained from situation s◦ by means of a favourable
composite permutation as described in Figure 4.3. For social welfare not to decrease, we need
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to have












   
   
Uyy(u + ϑ + ξ,h + p + r + 2)
−2Uyy(u + ϑ + ξ,h + p + r + 1)
+Uyy(u + ϑ + ξ,h + p + r)

   
   
dϑdξ = 0,
where ∆ := v − u > 0 and  := w − u > 0, which is clearly satisﬁed if condition C8 holds.
For later reference we introduce
(4.6) U22 := {U ∈ U | conditions C1 to C8 are fulﬁlled}.
Furthermore, we will say that situation s∗ results from situation s◦ by means of a T22-
transformation if s∗ can be obtained from s◦ by means of an ability increment and/or an in-
come increment and/or a favourable permutation and/or a progressive income transfer and/or
a progressive ability transfer and/or a favourable composite income permutation and/or a
favourable composite ability permutation and/or a favourable composite permutation. Then,
we have:
Remark 4.2 Social welfare does not decrease as the result of a T22-transformation if and only
if U ∈ U22.
Proof. It follows from the discussion above that U ∈ U21 is a suﬃcient condition for social
welfare not to decrease as the result of a T22-transformation. In order to prove that it is also
necessary, we argue a contrario and show that, if any of the conditions C1 to C8 is not fulﬁlled,
then there exists two situations s◦,s∗ ∈ Z such that s∗ is obtained from s◦ by means of a T22-
transformation but WU(s∗) < WU(s◦). Suppose that condition C8 is violated, in which case
there exists y ∈ D and h ∈ {1,2,...,H−2} such that Uyy(y,h+2)−2Uyy(y,h+1)+Uyy(y,h) >
0. Consider then the situations s◦ and s∗ depicted in Figure 4.3, and choose ∆ := v − u > 0








[Uyy(u,h + 2) − 2Uyy(u,h + 1) + Uyy(u,h)] < 0,
and we conclude that social welfare has decreased as the result of a favourable composite
permutation and, as a consequence as the result of a T22-transformation. We would arrive at
the same result when any of the conditions C1 to C7 does not hold by choosing appropriately
the situations s◦ and s∗.
Suppose that the utilitarian ethical observer subscribes to the value judgements embedded
in conditions C1 to C8. The next result identiﬁes a simple procedure in order to decide when
one situation is better than another according to utilitarian unanimity restricted to the class
U22.
Proposition 4.2 Consider two situations s◦,s∗ ∈ Z . Statements (a) and (b) below are
equivalent:































◦(ξ,r)dξ, ∀ y ∈ D, ∀ h ∈ H .
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Statement P4.2b is a second degree stochastic dominance condition for distributions of
two attributes, one cardinal and the other ordinal. Here again, we would like to stress the
crucial role played by the marginal distributions of income and ability. In particular, second
degree stochastic dominance for ability (condition P4.2b1) is necessary for social welfare to
increase, which underlines the importance of demographic changes for the assessment of living
standards in the society. Similarly, considering all types combined, the distribution of income
in situation s∗ must dominate to the second order the distribution of income in situation s◦ in
order that s∗ is ranked above s◦ by the unanimity utilitarian rule over the class U22 (condition
P4.2b2). Condition P4.2b3 requires that the sums of the integrals of the joint distribution
function corresponding to situation s∗ are nowhere above those corresponding to situation s◦,
for every income level y, where the summation is performed up to ability h, and that this





F(ξ,h)dξ = f(v,h)P(y |h), ∀ y ∈ D, ∀ h ∈ H ,
where P(y |h) is the poverty gap for the population of households of type h when the poverty
line is set to y, namely
(4.9) P(y |h) :=
Z y
v
(y − ξ)f(ξ |h)dξ, ∀ y ∈ D, ∀ h ∈ H ,
and f(y |h) is the conditional – upon ability – density function of income. Then, condition
P4.2b3 amounts to saying that the average poverty gap for the population consisting of the h
more able households is no greater in situation s∗ than in situation s◦, whatever the poverty
line y and whatever the ability level h.
5. Comparison with the Jenkins-Lambert Criterion
We restrict here attention to the case where ability is considered an ordinal variable, so that
only comparisons of utility levels between households of diﬀerent types make sense. The dom-
inance criterion introduced in Proposition 3.2 (conditions P3.2b1 and P3.2b2) diﬀers from the
procedure proposed by Jenkins and Lambert (1993). Fundamentally, the diﬀerence between
the two criteria originates in the way abilities are taken into account in the assessment of
household well-being. As we have seen, condition C1 deﬁnes implicitly an ordering of house-
hold types by assuming that a household of type h is less able – or equivalently has more
needs – than a household of type h+1. In place of condition C1, Jenkins and Lambert (1993)
proposed the following requirement:
C1∗ U(v,h) = U(v,h + 1), ∀ h = 1,2,...,H − 1.
This condition has been used subsequently by a number of scholars, including Chambaz and
Maurin (1998), Lambert and Ramos (2002), and Fleurbaey, Hagneré, and Trannoy (2003).
While, at ﬁrst sight, conditions C1 and C1∗ diﬀer signiﬁcantly, they are not totally indepen-
dent as C1∗ and C3 together imply C1. In conjunction with C3, condition C1∗ is stronger than
condition C1 to the extent that it requires that the utilities derived by the diﬀerent types are
the same for the highest conceivable income. The idea is that, for suﬃciently large incomes,
the diﬀerences in abilities have a negligible impact on household well-being. Assuming that
we agree with this view – it is always possible to compensate for diﬀerences in needs – it
remains an important diﬃculty relative to the implementation of the dominance criteria, as
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we will show later on. The dominance criterion of Jenkins and Lambert (1993) is obtained by
substituting condition C1∗ for condition C1 in Proposition 3.2. More precisely, letting
(5.1) U
∗
12 := {U ∈ U | conditions C1
∗, C2, C3, C4 and C5 are fulﬁlled},
their result can be stated as:
Proposition 5.1 Consider two situations s◦,s∗ ∈ Z . The following two statements are
equivalent:










◦(ξ,h)dξ, ∀ y ∈ D, ∀ h ∈ H .
The comparison of Propositions 3.2 and 5.1 makes clear that the Jenkins-Lambert criterion
is more powerful than the dominance criterion deﬁned by P3.2b. Indeed, condition P3.2b2
is the condition obtained by Jenkins and Lambert (1993) when one requires utilitarian una-
nimity to hold over the class U ∗
12. Technically, this is not surprising: since the class U ∗
12 is a
proper subset of the class U12, the quasi-ordering we get by requiring unanimity over U12 is
a subrelation of the quasi-ordering obtained starting with U ∗
12. Given the conditions we have
imposed on the household utility function, condition P3.2b2, while necessary, is insuﬃcient
to ensure that social welfare unambiguously improves. One must actually add a condition on
the marginal distributions of ability: whatever the ability level, the proportion of households
whose abilities do not exceed that level must be smaller in situation s∗ than in situation s◦.
Condition C1∗ amounts to considering that, for suﬃciently high incomes, ability diﬀerences
are negligible. The immediate question is to decide what is the income value from which we
consider that diﬀerences in ability no longer matter as far as household well-being is concerned.
It is far from clear that we can agree on such a value and it is thus dubious that condition
C1∗ can be unanimously approved. While, from a normative point of view, the diﬃculty can
be circumvented by letting v = +∞, for in this case Fleurbaey et al. (2003, Remark 5.1)
have shown that Proposition 5.1 boils down to Proposition 3.2, the diﬃculty still remains in
practice of choosing the right value of v.
To see the inherent problem with the Jenkins and Lambert (1993) approach, consider ﬁrst
the simple case where the population consists of identical households. In this case, we are
back to the standard unidimensional framework and the interval over which we compare the
distribution functions of diﬀerent situations is deﬁned by the smallest and the largest incomes
we observe. Thus, if we have to compare three distributions of income x, y and z, then the
pairwise ranking we get is consistent in the sense that the corresponding binary relation is
transitive. There is no need to deﬁne a common – to all distributions under comparison –
support since the rankings obtained by using the supports corresponding to all pairs or by
using the common support are identical, which results in an appreciable gain in terms of
computations.
This property is not satisﬁed in the case of the Jenkins-Lambert dominance criterion.
Actually, the choice of the upper bound of the income interval over which the distribution
functions are compared aﬀects the result of the comparisons. To highlight the diﬃculty,
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The joint densities corresponding to the situations s1, s2 and s3, which we denote respectively
by f1(y,h), f2(y,h) and f3(y,h) are deﬁned in Table 5.1. We also indicate the marginal
densities of income f1
1(y), f2
1(y) and f3




2(h). One can verify that a progressive income transfer is needed to convert situation s3
into situation s2, and Proposition 3.2 indicates that s2 is considered a better situation than
s3 by all utilitarian ethical observers who subscribe to the value judgements embedded in the
class U12. On the other hand, it does not seem possible to obtain situation s1 from situation
Table 5.1: Density functions of situations s1, s2 and s3
Income
f1(y,h) 1 2 3 4 5 f1
2(h)
Ability 1 0 0 2/3 0 0 2/3
2 0 1/3 0 0 0 1/3
f1
1(y) 0 1/3 2/3 0 0
Income
f2(y,h) 1 2 3 4 5 f2
2(h)
Ability
1 0 1/3 0 0 0 1/3
2 0 0 2/3 0 0 2/3
f2
1(y) 0 1/3 2/3 0 0
Income
f3(y,h) 1 2 3 4 5 f3
2(h)
Ability
1 0 1/3 0 0 0 1/3
2 1/3 0 0 0 1/3 2/3
f3
1(y) 1/3 1/3 0 0 1/3
s2 or from situation s3 – or vice versa – by means of ability increments, income increments,
favourable permutations, progressive income transfers or income favourable composite permu-
tations. Actually, the pairs {s1,s2} and {s1,s3} violate condition P3.2b, and we conclude from
Proposition 3.2 that the utilitarian unanimity over the class U12 cannot provide conclusive
rankings for these two pairs of situations. Applying now the test proposed by Jenkins and
Lambert (1993) to the pairs of situations {s1,s2}, {s2,s3}, and {s1,s3}, with
























12 is the utilitarian quasi-ordering when unanimity is imposed over the class U ∗
12.
Thus, contrary to what happens in the unidimensional case, the ranking obtained by means
of pairwise comparisons is not transitive.
Assuming that we choose as the upper bound v the largest income in the two distributions
under comparison, a direct implication is that it is possible to manipulate the ranking of the
situations by introducing a new situation. In the preceding example, if the agenda consists
only of situations s1 and s2, then we conclude that s1 ≥U ∗
12 s2. Let us now introduce situation
s3 which is dominated by situation s2 when we proceed by means of pairwise comparisons.
One intuitively expects that taking into account this new situation will not call into question
the ranking of situations s1 and s2. Actually, the introduction of situation s3 into the agenda
results in a modiﬁcation of the ranking of situations s1 and s2 that become non-comparable.
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By the same token, this example demonstrates that the result of the comparisons de-
pends crucially on the upper bound of the income support used for implementing the Jenkins-













5 0, ∀ y 5 4,
> 0, ∀ y > 4.
The marginal distributions of income being identical in situations s1 and s2, it follows from
Proposition 5.1 that s1 dominates s2 as long as v 5 4, while no conclusive verdicts emerges
if v > 4. Obviously, the problem vanishes if we choose an upper bound value suﬃciently
high: greater than 4 in our example and possibly greater than Bill Gates’ fortune in empirical
work. Beyond the computational costs that this may cause, there is no guarantee that in a
near future the wealth of Bill Gates will not be exceeded, which might challenge all results
obtained up to that time.
While it is not immediately clear, the only way to guarantee that the ranking of situations
by the Jenkins-Lambert criterion is robust to the kind of manipulation described above is




















◦(ξ,h)dξ, ∀ y 5 ˜ v, ∀ h ∈ H ,
whenever ˜ v = v = max{x∗
i,x◦




◦(y,h), ∀ y = v, ∀ h ∈ H .
Since by deﬁnition there is no income in situations s∗ and s◦ greater than v, the diﬀerence
F ∗(y,h)−F ◦(y,h) is constant over the interval [v,+∞), and (5.7) reduces to condition P3.2b1.
We insist on the fact that all the dominance criteria we have proposed in this paper are
transitive and cannot be manipulated by the strategic introduction of a non-relevant situation.
6. Concluding Remarks
Building upon the results of Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) in the case of continuous and
cardinal variables, we have proposed four dominance criteria in order to compare income
distributions for populations of households with diﬀering needs. These criteria can be consid-
ered extensions of the sequential dominance criteria introduced by Atkinson and Bourguignon
(1987) for making comparisons of income distributions between populations whose marginal
distributions of needs are identical. No restrictions were imposed on the marginal distributions
of needs and our criteria can in principle be used for evaluating the impact on the society’s
standards of living of changing demographic patterns. From this point of view, our results
are in line with those of Jenkins and Lambert (1993) and Chambaz and Maurin (1998). How-
ever, our criteria diﬀer in the way needs are taken into account in the assessment of social
welfare. Beyond this normative diﬀerence, our criteria have the advantage – once the choice
of the ordered list of abilities has been agreed on – of being immune to manipulation: it is not
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possible to modify the ranking of the situations under comparison by introducing an irrele-
vant situation. The second contribution of this article consists in uncovering the elementary
transformations of the distributions underpinning the normative conditions imposed on the
household utility functions. These transformations, which involve at the same time income
and ability, highlight the normative meaning of the restrictions placed on the utility functions
– and beyond that the value judgements – that some might consider diﬃcult to understand
or even arbitrary.
While the approach taken in the paper is framed in terms of comparisons of income distri-
butions for populations of households who diﬀer in terms of their demographic characteristics,
it applies more generally to any situation where one attribute is continuous, cardinal and
transferable between the individuals and the other attribute is ordinal and non-transferable.
As we have alluded to in Section 2, the application of the technique of stochastic dominance
to the comparison of distributions of household’s well-being involves strong and speciﬁc as-
sumptions about the way the household utility function is derived. The comparison of income
distributions where the income recipients diﬀer in health is an instance of a case exempt of
such problems. Other potential applications concern the comparisons of income distributions
when additional information is available about the environment of the income recipients such
as the exposure to risks and crime, or the presence of local public goods. In all these cases, the
ethical observer may have some reluctance to attach a cardinal meaning to the values taken
by these variables and may prefer to build on an ordinal information. More generally, the ap-
proach can be easily adapted to the situation where both attributes are cardinally measurable
and continuous as it is the case in the original article of Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982).
Then, the partial summations involved in statements P4.1b2, P4.2b1 and P4.2b3 would have
to be replaced by integrals and the ﬁrst and second utility diﬀerences in conditions C1, C3,
C5, C6, C7 and C9 by the appropriate derivatives. Fundamentally, the diﬀerence between
our approach and that of Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) is the recognition that the vari-
ables that contribute to the society’s welfare are not treated in a symmetric way. Allowing
for asymmetries into the analysis opens the route to dominance criteria at variance with the
standard ones and may provide in some cases a more appropriate framework (see for instance
Muller and Trannoy (2010)).
The approach presented here has a number of limitations, among which an important one
is the fact that we focused on bidimensional distributions. Given the asymmetry between the
variables taken into account, one might think of introducing either more than one cardinal
variable or more than one ordinal variable. In principle the approach presented here extends
naturally to these cases even though one should expect that the number of incomparabilities
will increase dramatically. An important motivation of the present analysis was to uncover
the transformations of the situations that correspond to diﬀerent standard properties of the
utility function. While we have shown that there exist one-to-one relationships between the
elementary transformations of the situations and the properties of the utility functions, a
lot still remains to be achieved. In particular, one might be willing to identify the precise
way in which these transformations have to be combined in order to generate the dominating
situation starting from the dominated one in a ﬁnite number of steps. Although there exist
attempts in the literature in this direction – for instance Moyes (1996) has results for favourable
permutations in the degenerate case where there is only one individual of each type – it must
be recognised that we do not yet know a lot. Building on Bourguignon (1989), it is possible
to consider a class of utility functions that lies between classes U11 and U12. This is done
by requiring that the household utility function is non-decreasing in ability, non-decreasing in
income at a declining rate with ability, and concave with respect to income. Gravel and Moyes
(2010) have identiﬁed the transformations which improve social welfare when situations are
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evaluated by means of utilitarian unanimity. Finally part of our results continue to hold if one
substitutes welfarist unanimity for utilitarian unanimity (see Gravel and Moyes (2011)).
A. Proofs of the Main Results
Sufficient Conditions. Let ∆WU := WU(s∗)−WU(s◦) and ∆f(y,h) := f∗(y,h)−f◦(y,h),
for all y ∈ D and all h ∈ H . The variation in social welfare when we go from situation s◦ to









Case 1: U ∈ U11. Integrating by parts the term within braces in (A.1) and letting ∆F(y,h) :



















We refer the reader to Fishburn and Vickson (1978, pp. 72–73) for a justiﬁcation of this way
of proceeding in the case of non-continuous distribution functions. Rearranging (A.2) and

















Since by deﬁnition ∆F(v,H) = 0, condition P3.1b guarantees that ∆WU = 0, for all U ∈ U11.






































































and conditions P3.2b1 and P3.2b2 ensure that ∆WU = 0, for all U ∈ U12.
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Conditions P4.1b1 and P4.1b2 ensure that ∆WU = 0, for all U ∈ U21.


































































and conditions P4.2b1, P4.2b2 and P4.2b3 guarantee that ∆WU = 0, for all U ∈ U22.
Necessary Conditions. We consider successively Proposition 3.1 to 4.2 and we show that,
if condition (b) is not satisﬁed, then it is possible to ﬁnd a utility function belonging to the
relevant class such that ∆WU := WU(s∗) − WU(s◦) < 0.
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Case 1: U ∈ U11. Suppose that condition P3.1b is not veriﬁed and let (y∗,h∗) be the smallest
– in the lexicographic sense – couple (y,h) (h 6= H) such that F ∗(y,h) > F ◦(y,h). Consider





0 if v 5 y < y∗,
ϑ if y∗ 5 y 5 v,
and let φ∗ be a diﬀerentiable approximation of φ with positive ﬁrst derivatives (see Fishburn
and Vickson (1978, p. 75) for details). Choose the utility function U such that U(y,h) :=
φ∗(y), for all y ∈ D and all h = 1,2,...,h∗ − 1, and U(y,h) := ϑ, for all y ∈ D and all
h = h∗,h∗ + 1,...,H. By construction U ∈ U11, but we can check that ∆WU < 0. Hence
condition P3.1a is not veriﬁed.
Case 2: U ∈ U12. Suppose to begin with that condition P3.2b1 is not veriﬁed and let h∗ be
the smallest index h ∈ {1,2,...,H − 1} such that F ∗(v,h) > F ◦(v,h). Choose U such that
U(y,h) := 0, for all y ∈ D and all h = 1,2,...,h∗−1, and U(y,h) := ϑ > 0, for all y ∈ D and
all h = h∗,h∗ + 1,...,H. Even though U ∈ U21, one can check that ∆WU < 0. Suppose next
that condition P3.2b2 does not hold and denote by (y∗,h∗) the smallest – in the lexicographic















y − y∗ if v 5 y < y∗,
0 if y∗ 5 y 5 v,
and let ψ∗ be a diﬀerentiable approximation of ψ with non-negative ﬁrst derivatives and non-
positive second derivatives (see Fishburn and Vickson (1978, p. 76) for details). Choose the
utility function U such that U(y,h) := ψ∗(y), for all y ∈ D and all h = 1,2,...,h∗ − 1,
and U(y,h) := 0, for all y ∈ D and all h = h∗,h∗ + 1,...,H. By deﬁnition, U ∈ U12, but
∆WU < 0. Hence condition P3.2a is violated.
Case 3: U ∈ U21. Suppose ﬁrst that condition P4.1b1 is not fulﬁlled and denote by y∗ the





0 if v 5 y < y∗,
Hϑ if y∗ 5 y 5 v,
and let ϕ∗ be a diﬀerentiable approximation of ϕ. Consider then the utility function U deﬁned
by U(y,h) := ϕ(y), for all y ∈ D and all h ∈ H . While by deﬁnition U ∈ U21, one easily
checks that ∆WU < 0. Hence condition P4.1a does not hold. Suppose next that condition
P4.1b2 is not satisﬁed and let (y∗,h∗) indicate the smallest – in the lexicographic sense –















(h − 1)ϑ if v 5 y < y∗,
h∗ϑ if y∗ 5 y 5 v,
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and let χ∗ be a diﬀerentiable approximation de χ. Choose the utility function U such that
U(y,h) := χ∗(y), for all y ∈ D and all h = 1,2,...,h∗ − 1, and U(y,h) := h∗ϑ, for all y ∈ D
and all h = h∗,h∗ + 1,...,H. Again, while U ∈ U21, it can be shown that ∆WU < 0, and we
conclude that condition P4.1a is not satisﬁed.
Case 4: U ∈ U22. The proofs of the necessity of conditions P4.2b1 and P4.2b2 are based on
similar arguments as those used for Cases 2 and 3 above and they are not reproduced. Suppose
then that condition P4.2b3 is violated and let (y∗,h∗) be the smallest – in the lexicographic



















(h∗ − h − 1)[y − y∗] if v 5 y < y∗,
0 if y∗ 5 y 5 v,
and let κ∗ be an appropriate diﬀerentiable approximation of χ. Choose the utility function U
deﬁned by U(y,h) := κ∗(y), for all y ∈ D and all h = 1,2,...,h∗ − 1, and U(y,h) := 0, for
all y ∈ D and all h = h∗,h∗ +1,...,H. While by deﬁnition U ∈ U22, on can easily check that
∆WU < 0, which proves that condition P4.2a does not hold.
B. Multidimensional Dominance Criteria for Continuous Variables
Let X1 and X2 be two continuous attributes – or variables – taking their values in D1 := [u,u]
and D2 := [v,v ], respectively. For instance, X1 is the person’s income while X2 is her life
expectancy. We are interested in the distribution of attributes X1 and X2 and we indicate by
F the corresponding joint (cumulative) distribution function deﬁned by
F(u,v) = P (X1 5 u and X2 5 v), ∀ (u,v) ∈ D := D1 × D2,
with F(u,v) = 0 and F(u,v) = 1. We denote by F the set of the joint distribution functions
that are diﬀerentiable and we indicate by U := {U : D → R | U is diﬀerentiable} the set of







where f is the joint density function corresponding to F, in order to compare diﬀerent joint
distributions. Consider the following properties of the utility function U ∈ U :
B.1 U1 = 0
B.2 U2 = 0
B.3 U12 5 0
B.4 U22 5 0
B.5 U221 = 0
B.6 U11 5 0
B.7 U112 = 0
B.8 U1122 5 0
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The class of utility functions below is important for the next result:
U
∗ := {U ∈ U | conditions B.1, B.2 and B.3 are fulﬁlled}.
Then, we have the following result (Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982)):
Proposition B.1 Consider two distribution functions F,G ∈ F. The following two state-
ments are equivalent:
(a) WU(F) = WU(G), ∀ U ∈ U ∗.
(b) F(u,v) 5 G(u,v), ∀ (u,v) ∈ D.
Letting now
U
∗∗ := {U ∈ U | conditions B.1 to B.8 are fulﬁlled},
we obtain (Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982)):
Proposition B.2 Consider two distribution functions F,G ∈ F. Statements (a) and (b)
below are equivalent:

























G(s,t)dsdt, ∀ (u,v) ∈ D.
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